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Subject of analysis and elaboration in this paper is the market of corporate control and takeover as one of the instruments of internal governance companies. The market for corporate control (external corporate control), together with market products, goods, capital and services is a special feature of the market economy. Overall, the market for corporate control is developed as a fourth type of market where trading with stocks capital takes place on a large scale, and which contributes to the change in control over the companies.
Expansion of the market for corporate control is directly related to the internal management of companies, regarding the work and responsibility of the management of companies. Possibility of takeover and establishing control of companies (public takeover offer companies - friendly and hostile takeover), is treated as one of the most powerful instruments for the control of management body.
Statutory amendments generally, and especially the acquisition is an important control tool in the allocation of corporate control. Takeover allows changing of inefficient members against their will. Moreover, the very threat of takeover affects the behavior of members of the Board of Directors. Because of this, the effective market for corporate control is a prerequisite for effective management system.
Takeover issue is particularly important in many ways. Regarding management body, the acquisition is treated as desirable or undesirable instrument. The latter is determined by whether it is a friendly or a hostile takeover of the company. From the shareholders point of view, offer for public takeover always puts them in a privileged position, which often generates numerous and heterogeneous shareholders fluctuations. This is a case when it’s a question of dispersed shareholder structure, which creates conditions for application of concept of "prisoner’s dilemma" that for management body conditions for preservation of the existing position.















 Study of the concept of "takeover" as a legal instrument for corporate control, requires an overhaul analysis of several interrelated issues in the areas of corporate governance and corporate control.
Issue of "takeover" is closely linked to issues of defense measures of target company, motives for takeover of the target company, the relation between shareholders and management of the target company in the process of takeover, the principles of corporate governance, and finally, legal implications of taking inadmissible measures of defense by taking control of the capital. 
Corporate control market is a segment of financial market that trades control capital companies. Transfer of corporate control is realized through the transfer of securities with voting rights. At the market for corporate control, “at least pact voting capital" is bought, that provides governance with the company. The purchase of the voting capital is realize through takeover bid, which may be motivate by numerous and heterogeneous causes. From the management body, takeover bid can be voluntary and involuntary accepted. Based on whether it is voluntary or involuntary takeover, management body, pursuant to the applicable domestic and European and international law, need to protect the interests of the company and shareholders. The practice shows the opposite. In case of sending takeover bid, the management completely channeled its energy to take measures of defense from unfriendly takeover. 
Hostile takeover defense measures are not unknown topic to the shareholders too. Theory and practice are familiar with diversity and variety of such measures (restrictions on transfer of stock – vincilation, statutory restriction of the transfer of stock, contractually limiting the transmission of action, limiting the maximum number of votes, etc.). But essentially, remains the fact that offer for takeover is sent to them, so the acceptance of the offer and the transformation of equity depends only from their will and the conditions in the offer. 
Another situation is when third party makes a bid to acquire, which is contrary to the interests of the management. It is often the case in view of the consequences generated by takeover, and related to the management of the company.
Basically, all problems generate from the existence of three groups of stakeholders in companies who have different interests, and the existence of "the agency problem" which basically explains the origin of the notion of corporate governance. In the field of takeover, essential question is the relation (interest) between management bodies versus interests (risks) of shareholders. According to the interests of the voting capital, the company's primary interest lie in the shareholders. Hence, the increase in value of the stock, directly reflects the increasing interest of the other constituents in the company (American doctrine and practice). 
By contrast, the interests of management are tied to a retention of their position, and increase fees on the basis of the signed management contracts. This is not always related to good corporate performance. Notably, in the open joint-stock company separation between management ownership structure exist. Management of the corporation, which is separate from the equity holders located in specific advocacy position. Hence, the possibility of a conflict of interests, that often generate bad corporate governance.








Takeover bid is an offer that bidder sent to the holder of stocks with voting rights, in order to gain control of the company. In terms of Law on the takeover of joint stock companies, the bidder is a person or entity that has made a public takeover bid, regardless of whether such takeover bid has been made for the purpose of meeting its obligations stipulated in Article 4 or Article 5 of this Law.​[1]​ Takeover bid is a basic concept in the takeover law. Bidder shall mean any natural or legal person uprising or confined to issue takeover bid to acquire shares in the target company.​[2]​ ‘Takeover bid’ or ‘bid’ shall mean a public offer made to the holders of the securities of a company to acquire all or some of those securities, whether mandatory or voluntary, which follows or has as its objective the acquisition of control of the offeree company in accordance with national law.​[3]​ 
Prior to making the takeover bid, the bidder shall simultaneously notify the Commission, the governing body of the joint stock company to which the takeover bid refers to, and the Commission for the Protection of Competition, and shall publish its intention within one working day following the notification.​[4]​ 
The takeover bid shall be accepted by means of a written statement of bid acceptance by the holders of securities.  The written statement of acceptance of the bid shall be sent to the bank or the brokerage house, and the holders of securities shall reserve the securities at a separate account with the Central Securities Depository, and can no longer have them at their disposal.
Through acceptance of the bid, the bidder is transformed into the acquirer of the shares of the target company. In this context, acquirer shall mean any natural or legal person with the completion of the procedure for undertaking acquires controlling equity participation in the target company. 
1.2. Target Company

	Target company is a company to which bidder has sent takeover bid to its shareholders. This mean a company, the securities of which are the subject of a bid. Considering the free transfer of shares, any joint stock company (with the exception of closed societies), may be subject to takeover. Referral of public offer for takeover is directly related to acquisition of dominant (controlled company) capital participation in the target company. The dominant position of the shareholder practically is measured by its ability to participate in the general meeting of shareholders, to resolve present and appoint new members of the management.​[5]​ With the acquisition of shares in the target company, a relationship between controlling and controlled company is create.​[6]​ The latter directly or indirectly has an overwhelming influence, and dictate the terms of operation of the management body in the controlling company. Target companies for the most part become the subject of takeover due to poor management that gives incentive for takeover by third-party companies. The latter believe that the target company can be far more profitable.
 
1.3. Object of takeover bid
	
	Subject of the offer are the transferable securities which give voting rights in the company. They are the object of acquisition (voting capital). Object of the offer is directly related to the offree, because it determine the persons to whom the offer is addressed, and vice versa. Basically any takeover is tied to the purchase of the voting capital, in order to create an opportunity for changing the management structure of the target company. According to Macedonian law,​[7]​ the takeover bid shall apply to the following securities: voting shares, and securities with the right of conversion into voting shares.

TAKEOVER PRINCIPLES OF LAW

1. Introductory remarks on the principles of takeover law
	
Elaboration of the fundamental principles of takeover is directly related to the conduct of the management body of the target company. The management of the target company is required to act in the best interests of the shareholders of the target company. This is especially case during the takeover process. Management body is generally required to proceed with “prudence of a meticulous and conscientious commercial entity.”​[8]​ Subject of analysis and elaboration in this segment will be only base principles that are applicable to the takeover process.
1.1. Principle of transparency of data taking and defense measures of target company
	
The principle of transparency​[9]​ in the procedure for takeover is a basic principle. On the one hand, it contributes to the protection of the interests of more groups of stakeholders, and on the other, it creates pressure/scrutiny for compliance with the rules by the governing bodies.
Giving systematic information of the market of corporate control to the investors has a multi-faceted role. Management body plays a key role in the process of takeover. Generally, from their behavior depends the difficulties of acquisition of the target company.The person who shows interest in acquisition, must be familiar with the working conditions of the company, activity that realizes, the available of human and technical capacities, the company profit and loss etc. Specifically, the potential acquirer must check the legal and economic suitability company takeover. Economic eligibility is tied to the economic parameters of the company. In contrast, the legal eligibility refers to the introduction of the corporate mechanism in order to determine what defense measures taken over the target company.
Transparency is important for shareholders who are only interested on opportunity to make profit.  Respectability to the principle of transparency contributes to preventing potential abuses by management. Thereby indirectly creates external pressure for better corporate governance, hence reducing the danger of the target company to be taken over, and the current administration resolved.​[10]​
	
1.2. Principle of neutrality of the management of the target company

Principle of neutrality or better known as a principle of making joint stocks decisions, is a basic principle which plays an essential role in the takeover process. The principle of neutrality means that management of the target company has to be real and impersonal during the procedure of takeover. In legal literature distinction is made between the principle of neutrality and the principle of absolute neutrality. The latter refers to the fact that the management body cann’t take any measures to defend that may affect the success of the takeover bid. Respectability of this principle plays a huge role in the creation and implementation of good corporate mechanism. Taking into account the fact the application of the principle of neutrality has tied the hands of the management, they don’t have any choice but to focus on better corporate governance. 

HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AS AN EXTERNAL (CONTROL) INSTRUMENTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

1. Notion of a hostile takeover

Hostile takeover is “takeover bid” contrary to the will of the management body of the company. As a matter of company law, hostile takeover is a matter that attracts the attention of a wider circle of stakeholders: attorneys, banks, brokerage houses, investment companies, in circumstances when management doesn’t have a will to create climate for acquiring equity participation by third party / new owner equity.
Hostile takeover is a process that necessarily creates an environment for creating measures of defense.​[11]​ The qualification "hostile" to the takeover bid generate from the perception of management. In practice, the management rarely gives support to the potential acquirer. In case of lack of support, hostile takeover transformed into a friendly, and members of the governing bodies retain or provide better position than the existing one. There are several reasons why a company might want or need a hostile takeover. The major reason may be of financial gain instead of economic or business gain.    

2. Hostile takeover and danger for the board of directors

Unsolicited takeover bids play an important role in the market for corporate control. The threat of a takeover bid represents an external control mechanism serving in principle to motivate managers to operate the firm they oversee efficiently. Takeovers have been widely interpreted as the critical corporate governance mechanism without which managerial discretion cannot be effectively controlled. 
A takeover is considered “hostile” if the target company’s board rejects the offer, but the bidder continues to pursue it, or the bidder makes the offer without informing the target company’s board beforehand. In this context, the hostile takeover of Arcelor by Mittal Steel reflects the changes in terms of governance, market for corporate control, and the mechanism for  hostile takeovers, that had occurred in Europe throughout the last decade.  These changes were mainly motivated by growing shareholder activism, led by institutional investors and hedge funds that entered the Continental European market during the 1980s and introduced this market to U.S. style shareholder activism. Lawmakers responded, and took various steps to 27  reduce protectionism of local firms and increase shareholder’s power vis-à- vis management and dominant shareholders. Also, it became evident that mergers and acquisitions (particularly hostile deals) were consistently increasing shareholder gains. 
This created a market for corporate control, where firms that did not give the best return to their shareholders could replace their management with more competent management from another firm. This was the case of Arcelor’s management (with a poor performance that reflected in P/E of 4), who was replaced by Mittal Steel’s management (which had a better performance that reflected in a P/E of 5). The decisive factor for analysts and investors, in all likelihood, was that Mittal Steel´s management could better take advantage of the synergies of the combined firm and eventually reach the same P/E level of other steel firms (which were in the 8–9 P/E range). This was a huge windfall for Arcelor shareholders, who received a 43% price increase for their shares out of the deal (Financial Times, 2006).​[12]​
Takeovers are sufficiently expensive that only very major performance failures are likely addressed. It is not just the cost of mounting a takeover that makes them expensive. Acquisitions can actually increase agency costs when bidding managements overpay for acquisitions that bring them private benefits. A fluid takeover market might enable managers to expand their empires more easily, and not just stop excessive expansion of empires. Jensen clearly shows that disciplinary hostile takeovers were only a small fraction of takeover activity in the 1980s in the US.
Takeovers require a liquid capital market, which gives bidders access to vast amounts of capital on short notice. In the 1980s in the US, the firm of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert created such a market through junk bong financing. The collapse of such a firm may have contributed to the end of the takeover wave. 
Last but not least, hostile takeovers are politically an extremely vulnerable mechanism, since they are opposed by the managerial lobbies. In the US, this political pressure which manifested itself through anti-state takeover legislation, contributed to ending the 1980s takeover wave. In other countries, the political opposition to hostile takeovers in part explains their general non-existence in the first place. The takeover solution practiced in the US and the UK then is a very imperfect and politically vulnerable method of concentrating ownership. ​[13]​ 
  
MEASURES OF DEFENSE AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVERS

1. Definition and basic characteristics of the defense measures

Defining the term "defense measures" is a complex task. Generally established rule is that the term "defense measures" means actions that the bodies of the joint stock companies shall take within the limits of their power, and that by their nature are eligible to obstruct or hinder taking control. In order to properly grasp the concept of defense of control measures based upon the analysis of the question: which are the main motives of certain trading company to issue a public takeover bid? Furthermore, as the bidder evaluated which point it is appropriate to submit a formal bid to acquire?
Experiences of work practices show that determining the true motives of the acquirer is always ex post. This, in the sense that the bidder seeks at the time of filing a public bid to acquire their true motives to conceal trying to formally present valid reasons for taking. 
Generally established rule is that a potential acquirer in building the strategy to take based upon the desire for profit doubling, changing the inefficient management body, the desire to create a corporate empire, exploitation foreclosed company in terms of use of its resources, the desire to create synergy profit etc. Often in business practice, taking stems from the desire of the bidder to remove the impact of its competitors as would strengthen its market position.​[14]​ 






2. Measures of hindering taking control in target company
a) Poison Pills

The large number of hostile takeovers that have flooded America in the second half of the twentieth century imposed the necessity of constructing a separate Institute of Company Law in response to the progressive strategy for hostile takeover. Designed in 1982, poison pills undoubtedly represent the most complex and effective defense measures, germ of American corporate practice. 
Poison pills are characterized by few specifics/features that distinguish them from other defense measures. Based on these characteristics they acquire enormous popularity in the corporate practice. The essence of this institute is best shown by the following: a hostile takeover of the target company adopted poison pills, the acquirer will "swallow the pill" whose "toxic effect" in significant measure will reduce its capital investment and voting rights.​[15]​
Poison pills (ang.Poison pills / ger.Giftpillen) are an integral part of the most popular class takeover defense measures. Their dominance in the business practice is a consequence of their efficacy in blocking supply for takeover by a potential acquirer. However, the power of the poison pill is reflected in the delay of the acquisition. In ultima linea, poison pills serve the management body to destabilize the acquirer, and get the most out of them in return for the loss of their personal positions. Finally, poison action pill amounts to extortion as a higher premium for shareholders.

b) Golden Parachutes 

Action/power of golden parachutes can be seen in the exacerbation of taking control. Golden parachutes can produce the effect of preventing the acquisition only in combination with other measures of defense. Justification of the institute primarily arises from the reduction (elimination) of inherent dispute that really existing between shareholders and the management body of the company. This is fact in the sense that management body protects the interest of the shareholders, in a situation where their future is assured. 







The essence of "finding a white knight" as a measure of defense by taking control consists in the search for alternative / competitive bid to acquire according to which management is friendly. Specifically, the management of the company motivated by unfavorable supply current bidder or his intentions after ending the procedure to attack the positions of directors, to take measures aimed at finding "most suitable" bidder for shareholders. In this sense, the company's white knight agreement for takeover (merger agreement) order to protect target companies from hostile takeover. ​[17]​
Comparative experiences show that white knight institute is deeply integrated into corporate practice. Its action primarily concerns the protection of the interests of shareholders.
This exists in the sense that shareholders regardless of who will take over the company are in a privileged position. In the struggle between the company's white knight and the original acquirer shareholders only wait the winner and the amount of compensation for the sold shares. Entity during the whole process of downloading is under pressure and play an active role in the process of taking the authority manages.​[18]​ However, the final decision on who will be the winner of the procedure for taking decisions: shareholders in the company. This is because the offer for takeover in ultima linea is addressed to the owners of the shares.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL DEFENSE MEASURES

1. Sanctions against illegal defensive measures of board

1.1. Company’s Civil law Administrative law and Criminal law sanctions  

	In the area of ​​civil (legal) defense sanctions against illegal measures, we emphasize the decisions of management body and it governance. Macedonian Law on the takeover of joint stock companies regulates only misdemeanor liability in case of adopting illegal action by the board. In essence, this means that concerning this question the general Company and civil law sanctions are applicable, and prescribed rules of contract law: the annulment of the decision of the board or legal matters in the execution of the taken decisions, and request for compensation.
Regarding the annulment of decisions analogous rules apply appeal for contesting from Shareholders. Bidder may annulment the decision for adoption of illegal measures and action for establishment of nullity.​[19]​
In the field of administrative and legal sanctions, the main role has the Securities and Exchange Commission as a regulatory body in the field of acquisition. The Commission shall determine the legality of acts of the governing body and assess whether the behavior is consistent with the adopted principles of transparency and neutrality.





This paper focus on the topic of takeover as an instrument for foreign control of corporate governance. Corporate governance has become increasingly important in recent business history. In the past few years there were countless stories of corporate scandals. Because of these scandals, billions of dollars of shareholder value was wiped out. Scandals shock huge corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and many more. Even huge investment banks were tainted by corporate scandals that pushed several big banks to pay hundreds of million of dollars to settle with.  
One of the largest global auditing firms Arthur Andersen was sold to rival firms as a result of its involvement in the Enron case. Moreover funds were also hit by corporate corruption as well. Almost every sector of the economy was plagued by this corporate vice. 
Through analyze of several issues related to this topic, we elaborate key components which applicability means good corporate governance. In terms of good corporate governance, each offer sent by a third party is real, not follow only by exploitation of resources of the company, and without a real business plan development. One of those issues is the question of respectability of the principle of "takeover," which is a prerequisite for ensuring good corporate governance. In this context, provisions from the Directive 2004/25/EC: "in order to reinforce the effectiveness of existing provisions concerning the freedom to deal in the securities of companies covered by this Directive and the freedom to exercise voting rights, it is essential that the defensive structures and mechanisms envisaged by such companies be transparent and that they be regularly presented in reports to general meetings of shareholders.
Finally, the legal consequences followed by legal sanctions pose a threat to the governing bodies for their behavior. These sanctions are an instrument for the protection of shareholders from unlawful acts and actions of the "Management body" in the procedure for the takeover. After all the analysis and elaboration of theory and practice remain the conclusion that sanctions about illegal measures should be more rigorous. Basically takeover bid is one of the mechanisms by which the management body feels the biggest fear. World trends of globalization and diversification of trade activity inevitably contributed to increasing the number of takeover, followed by friendly measures. Taking this into account, the management body strongly feel the threat of takeover, hence the threat from dismissal. The latter becomes an effective instrument of good corporate governance.
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